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This article presents a comprehensive summary of the regulatory environment confronting low earth orbit, non-geostationary satellite orbit (LEO NGSO) communication satellites and critically evaluates analogies from terrestrial spectrum management as possibilities for LEO NGSO satellites. This analysis provides a framework for empirical analysis of the alternatives considered. 

Abstract The exploitation of radio-electric spectrum bands for wireless transmission purposes has some features of the commons: it is subject to congestion and conflict without rules governing its use. The Coasean approach is to assign private property rights to overcome the tragedy of the spectrum commons. The process of assigning these rights is still centralized, with governments assigning property rights through agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the USA. We consider the possibility of self-governance of the spectrum. We use insights from the study of common pool resources governance to analyze the emergence of property rights to spectrum in a ‘government-less’ environment in which norms, rules, and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of the repeated interactions among participants in the network. Our case study considers the spectrum-sharing arrangement in the 1,695–1,710 MHz band. Using agent-based modeling (ABM), we show that self-governance of the spectrum can work and under what conditions it is likely to improve the efficiency of the allocation of property rights. 

n many countries, sharing has become a significant approach to problems of spectrum allocation and assignment. As this approach moves from concept to reality, it is reasonable to expect an increase in interference or usage conflict events between sharing parties. Scholars such as Coase, Demsetz, Stigler, and others have argued that appropriate enforcement is critical to successful contracts (such as spectrum sharing agreements) and Polinsky, Shavell, and others have analyzed enforcement mechanisms in general. While many ex-ante measures may be used, reducing the social costs of ex-ante enforcement means shifting the balance more toward ex-post measures. Ex post enforcement requires detection, data collection, and adjudication methods. At present, these methods are ad hoc (operating in a decentralized way between parties) or fairly costly (e.g., relying on the FCC Enforcement Bureau). The research presented in this paper is the culmination of an NSF-funded inquiry into how and what enforcement functions can be automated. 

Cooperative wireless networks, enabled by Cognitive Radios, facilitate mobile users to dynamically share access to spectrum. However, spectrum bands can be accessed illegitimately by malicious users. Therefore, the success of dynamic spectrum sharing relies on automated enforcement of spectrum policies. While the focus has been on ex ante spectrum enforcement, this work explores new approaches to address efficient ex post spectrum enforcement. The main objective of this work is to ensure maximum coverage of the area of enforcement and accurate detection of spectrum access violation. The first objective is achieved with the help of Lloyd's algorithm to divide the enforcement area into a set of uniformly sized coverage regions. The interference detection accuracy is achieved through crowdsourcing of the spectrum access monitoring to volunteers, based on their computational capabilities, location attributes and reputation. A simulation framework was developed in CSIM19 (C++ version) to analyze the performance of the proposed system over the entire area of enforcement. The results show that the proposed scheme ensures efficient coverage of all the channels and regions in the area of enforcement and a high average accuracy of detection. 

In many countries, sharing has become a significant approach to problems of spectrum allocation and assignment. As this approach moves from concept to reality, it is reasonable to expect an increase in interference or usage conflict events between sharing parties. Scholars such as Coase, Demsetz, Stigler, and others have argued that appropriate enforcement is critical to successful contracts (such as spectrum sharing agreements) and Polinsky, Shavell, and others have analyzed enforcement mechanisms in general. While many ex-ante measures may be used, reducing the social costs of ex-ante enforcement means shifting the balance more toward ex-post measures. Ex post enforcement requires detection, data collection, and adjudication methods. At present, these methods are ad hoc (operating in a decentralized way between parties) or fairly costly (e.g., relying on the FCC Enforcement Bureau). The research presented in this paper is the culmination of an NSF-funded inquiry into how and what enforcement functions can be automated.